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Abstract
Background Deliberate reflection on initial diagnoses
improved diagnostic accuracy in internal medicine
and general practice, but it is unknown if the same
occurs in specialties that rely mostly on visual per-
ception, such as dermatology. Moreover, whether
reflection influences diagnostic calibration has not
been studied yet. Diagnostic calibration, the relation-
ship between diagnostic accuracy and confidence in
that accuracy, affects diagnostic performance because
overconfidence tends to induce premature closure.
This study evaluated the effects of deliberate reflec-
tion on diagnostic accuracy and diagnostic calibration
in dermatology.
Methods Sixty-one sixth-year students from a Brazil-
ian medical school were allocated to either a reflection
group (RG) or a control group (CG). In both groups,
students worked with the same 12 dermatological im-
ages, presented sequentially, providing an initial diag-
nosis and confidence in that diagnosis. Subsequently,
RG students reflected on the case using a structured
procedure, while CG students performed a time-filler
activity. All students then provided a final diagnosis
and confidence in that diagnosis. Outcome measure-
ments were diagnostic accuracy, confidence, and cal-
ibration.
Availability of data and materials Data are available for
sharing upon request to the first author.
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Results Reflection increased diagnostic accuracy rela-
tive to control (49.7± 12.1 vs 38.4± 14.6; p= 0.002) but
did not affect confidence (64.3± 13.2 vs 58.9± 20.1;
p=0.228) nor calibration (0.15± 0.16 vs 0.20± 0.19,
p=0.197). Overall, case difficulty influenced calibra-
tion, with students showing more overconfidence on
more difficult cases (p<0.001).
Conclusions Deliberate reflection increased diagnos-
tic accuracy in dermatology but did not affect confi-
dence and calibration. Calibration was worse onmore
difficult cases, suggesting that calibration is a knowl-
edge-related phenomenon.
Keywords Diagnostic calibration · Deliberate
reflection · Clinical reasoning · Medical education
Introduction
Medical error has been recognized as an important
cause of adverse effects and deaths since the highly
cited 1999 Institute ofMedicine report called attention
to the problem [1].A recent review estimated that up
to 400,000 deaths a year could be attributed tomedical
error [2]. Diagnostic errors have been acknowledged
What this paper adds
Overconfidence is one of the most common biases
in diagnostic reasoning, adversely affecting physi-
cians’ decision-making, but there is little empirical
research on strategies to improve diagnostic cal-
ibration. This experiment assessed the effect of
deliberate reflection on diagnostic accuracy, con-
fidence and calibration of dermatological lesions.
We have shown that deliberate reflection improved
diagnostic accuracy but did not improve calibra-
tion, particularly due to its minimal effect on the
student confidence in their diagnostic accuracy.
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as one of the most common and harmful problems
affecting patient safety and are the leading cause of
paid malpractice claims, with higher rates in special-
ties that deal with high degrees of clinical uncertainty
[3–5].
Several factors usually underlie an error, but flaws
in physicians’ reasoning play a key role. Faulty rea-
soning contributed to around 75% of the diagnostic
errors investigated in US academic hospitals and is
also highly prevalent in outpatient care [6, 7]. These
reasoning flaws have been associated with excessive
reliance on first diagnostic impressions generated
through intuitive judgments [8]. In routine situations,
physicians generate diagnostic hypotheses through
a fast, to a large extent automatic, ‘matching’ of the
case at hand with examples of previous patients or
prototypes of diseases stored in memory [9]. This
process of ‘pattern recognition’ is usually efficient,
but when initial hypotheses are wrong, they can only
be corrected if a more thorough analysis of the case
takes place [8, 10]. If the physician then ‘trusts’ too
much his/her initial impression, does not submit it to
a more careful analysis and consider alternative hy-
potheses, an error would occur. When this happens,
the physician is usually said to have fallen into ‘pre-
mature closure’, which has been shown to be a major
source of cognitive diagnostic errors [6].
Premature closure may be more likely to occur
when there is a mismatch between the physician’s
confidence in the diagnosis and his/her actual per-
formance. This seems reasonable to expect, because
a clinician who is highly confident about having es-
tablished a correct diagnostic hypothesis would tend
to be less motivated to scrutinize it. When his/her
confidence is unjustified because the diagnostic hy-
pothesis is in fact wrong, the physician is said to be,
in this specific situation, overconfident [11]. Over-
confidence reflects a poor calibration between the
professional’s confidence in the diagnosis he/she
made for a particular case and the accuracy of such
diagnosis [11]. Empirical evidence, though scarce,
suggests that physicians may have a tendency to un-
derestimate the likelihood that their diagnoses are
incorrect [12, 13]. Overconfidence has indeed been
described in psychology research as a robust phe-
nomenon linked to biases in information processing
such as a tendency to selectively focus on evidence
that supports one’s initial impressions [14, 15].In
medicine, overconfidence has been said to open the
door for reasoning flaws such as confirmation bias
and premature closure adversely affecting physicians’
decision-making [11, 16, 17]. Together with other
sources of cognitive error such as availability and
anchoring heuristics, and personality traits such as
lower tolerance to risk, they seem to play a major role
in diagnostic inaccuracies [16].
Much attention has been drawn to strategies that
can possibly help prevent such biases and reduce di-
agnostic errors derived from reasoning flaws [18]. One
of these strategies is deliberate reflection on clinical
cases, which several studies have shown to improve
diagnostic accuracy [19, 20] and counteract cognitive
biases such as the availability bias [21, 22].
In these studies, deliberate reflection required
physicians to go back to the case that they had
just diagnosed and look for evidence that contra-
dicts their initial diagnostic hypothesis, generating
and contrasting alternative diagnoses. By doing so,
physicians can recognize relevant clinical findings
that have gone initially unnoticed, which may also be
helpful to improve diagnostic calibration. Indeed, this
expectation seems in line with research in psychology
showing that judgments were better calibrated, es-
pecially regarding overconfidence, when people were
requested to search for evidence that contradicts their
first impressions [14].
However, previous studies that have requested
physicians or medical students to deliberately reflect
were not concerned with diagnostic calibration but
only with diagnostic accuracy. Whether deliberate
reflection affects calibration remains unknown. If
reflection on one’s own perception of a visual pattern
works to reveal that inferences made about charac-
teristics of the lesions are not so unquestionable, this
could generate doubt and uncertainty, consequently
reducing a tendency towards overconfidence. More-
over, concerning the positive effects of reflection on
diagnostic accuracy, previous research has been con-
fined to medical specialties such as internal medicine
and family medicine, which require physicians to in-
terpret and integrate a diversity of clinical findings
and involve sequential judgments. It is not known
whether there would be any benefit of reflection in
specialties that are highly visual, such as dermatol-
ogy, when diagnosis tends to be based on a holistic
pattern-recognition process.
This experimental study investigated the effects
of a deliberate reflection procedure adapted for the
diagnosis of dermatology cases on diagnostic ac-
curacy and diagnostic calibration, i.e., the relation
between confidence in the diagnosis and accuracy.
Final-year medical students were asked to diagnose
a set of dermatology cases either by following the
deliberate reflection procedure or their conventional
approach. We hypothesized that deliberate reflection
would improve diagnostic accuracy and calibration.
Method
Design
We conducted a single-phase quasi-experimental
study. Students were systematically allocated to ei-
ther a reflection group (RG) or a control group (CG). In
both groups, students worked with the same 12 der-
matological images, in a sequential order. In both
groups, students were instructed to provide an ini-
tial diagnosis and their confidence in that diagnosis.
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Subsequently, while RG students reflected on the case
using a structured procedure, CG students engaged in
a time-filler activity. All students then provided a final
diagnosis and their confidence in that diagnosis.
Participants
Students enrolled in the sixth year of the Universidade
José do Rosário Vellano (Unifenas) Medical School,
Belo Horizonte, Brazil were invited to participate in
this study. The medical school has a six-year problem-
based learning curriculum. The students recruited
from the final year of the course had already had
contact with patients with dermatological lesions in
the fourth year of the course and during their family
medicine clerkship that is placed in the sixth year. All
volunteers gave written consent to participate in the
study.
Ethical approval for the study was granted by
our institutional review board (Universidade José do
Rosário Vellano Research Ethics Board, #1.931.044).
The study was carried out in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials and procedure
Before the beginning of the study, student self-percep-
tion of experience and knowledge of dermatological
lesions was evaluated. A form containing 20 dermato-
logical diagnoses (12 diagnoses used in the study and
8 distractors) was handed out to the students and, for
each listed diagnosis, the student rated his/her self-
perceived prior knowledge and clinical experience on
a 5-point Likert scale.
Twelve images of dermatological lesions were used
in this study. The diagnoses were: psoriasis, impetigo,
contact dermatitis, pemphigus, hives, leprosy, ring-
worm, basal-cell carcinoma, pigmented seborrhoeic
keratosis, melanocytic nevus, congenital nevus, and
melanoma. Prior to this study, a pilot was conducted
with internal medicine residents and fourth-year
medical students to evaluate the level of diagnostic
complexity of the images. Two lesions were excluded:
a lichen planus lesion, because none of the students
were able to confirm the diagnosis, and a tinea cruris
lesion, because all the students provided the correct
diagnosis. These lesions were substituted by a con-
tact dermatitis lesion and a tinea corporis lesion,
respectively.
The study was conducted right after regular didac-
tic lectures with six groups of students who were, at
the moment of the study, in different clinical rotations
(Obstetrics, Gynaecology, Primary Care, Specialty
Care, Emergency Care, Neonatal Care). In a sequen-
tial and alternate manner (i.e., the first rotation to the
experimental group, the second to control group and
so forth), we allocated the whole group of students
enrolled in a clinical rotation to either the Reflection
Group (RG) or Control Group (CG), an approach that
would help to prevent contamination.
Images of the dermatological lesions were pre-
sented to the students in a notepad, where each page
contained the image of one lesion with no medi-
cal history. For each image, the students from both
groups were told to provide, in 30s, an initial diag-
nostic hypothesis and assign their confidence in the
accuracy of the diagnosis by using a scale ranging
from 1 to 10 (1 equivalent to ‘I’m not confident’ and
10 to ‘I’m fully confident’).
Thereafter, the student performed a second task,
lasting 3min and 30s, which differed depending on
the experimental condition to which the student had
been allocated. The RG students were instructed to
engage in reflection on the case, following a proce-
dure in which they should (1) list the visual aspects
that supported their initial diagnosis and (2) those
that spoke against their diagnostic hypothesis. Par-
ticipants were subsequently asked to list two alter-
native diagnoses assuming that the initial diagnosis
generated for the lesion proved to be incorrect, and to
follow the same procedure (steps 1 and 2) for each al-
ternative diagnosis. Finally, they were asked to select
their final diagnosis for the case and assign their de-
gree of confidence in diagnostic accuracy (in the same
scale used to evaluate the confidence on the accuracy
of the initial diagnostic hypothesis). For the CG stu-
dents, the second task was a distractor activity which
consisted of finding nine medical terms (not related
to the lesions used in the study) in a crossword. After
that, the students were then asked to provide their fi-
nal diagnosis and their confidence in the accuracy of
this diagnosis. At the end of the activity, the students
from both groups answered a final question on the
number of lesions from the study that they believed
they had correctly diagnosed.
Data analysis
Two experts (P.R.B and G.B.C) independently assessed
the participants’ diagnoses blinded to the experimen-
tal conditions under which they were provided. The
diagnoses were evaluated as fully correct or incorrect
and scored as 1 or 0 points, respectively, and the total
percentage of correct diagnoses was computed.
For confidence, the scores given on each case were
summed and a percentage of the total confidence was
computed. Subsequently, the mean percentage of cor-
rect diagnoses and the mean percentage of confidence
in the correctness of the diagnosis were computed for
each experimental condition.
Calibration was defined as the alignment between
students’ confidence and accuracy. We evaluated such
alignment using the ‘over-under’ (O-U) index, which
indicated the direction and magnitude of calibration
error, ranging from –1 (highest possible level of under-
estimated confidence) to +1 (highest level of overesti-
mated confidence) [23]. The O-U index was calculated
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as the difference between the percentage of correct di-
agnoses and the percentage of confidence divided by
100.
We used Pearson’s χ2 test to compare baseline cate-
gorical variable (gender) and Student’s t-test for base-
line continuous variables (age, self-perception of prior
knowledge and experience) between groups. Diagnos-
tic accuracy in the initial and final phases (initial di-
agnosis and diagnosis after the task), final confidence,
and final calibration were compared between experi-
mental conditions using independent t-tests. In addi-
tion, to check whether there was a variation in accu-
racy between the initial and the final diagnosis which
differed between the two conditions, we computed
the ‘gain’ in diagnostic accuracy by subtracting the ini-
tial diagnosis from the final diagnosis and performed
an independent t-test on the ‘gain’. Effect sizes were
analyzed by computing Cohen’s d.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used to ana-
lyze the relationship between the students’ estimation
of right answers (0 to 12) and their actual diagnostic
accuracy.
As no overall effect of the reflection on the diagnos-
tic calibration was observed, a post-hoc analysis was
carried out to better understand the phenomenon.
A mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed
with experimental conditions as a between-subjects
factor (reflection group vs control group) and case
difficulty as within-subjects factor (easy vs difficult)
on calibration. The difficulty of the cases was de-
fined by using the performance data of the students in
the study itself. The six lesions in which the students
showed the best performance (i.e. the six highest di-
Table 1 Mean diagnostic accuracy (initial and final diagnosis), final confidence, and final calibration as a function of exper-
imental condition (reflection group vs control group); standard deviation into brackets
Outcome Group Statistics
Control (n= 28) Reflection (n= 33)
Accuracy (%)
Initial 40.48 (13.36) 45.96 (12.35) t(59)= 1.66; p= 0.10; d= 0.42
Final 38.4 (14.6) 49.7 (12.1) t(59)= 3.33; p= 0.002; d= 0.84
Confidence (%) 58.87 (20.10) 64.29 (13.20) t(59)= 1.26; p= 0.21; d= 0.31
Calibration (–1 a+ 1) 0.20± 0.19 0.15± 0.16 t(59)= 1.32; p= 0.19; d= 0.28
Table 2 Relationship between experimental condition and accuracy, confidence, and calibration as a function of case diffi-
culty
Difficulty Group p-value
Overall Control (n= 28) Reflection (n= 33)
Easier cases
Accuracy (%) 69.1± 22.3 60.1± 23.3 76.8± 18.6 0.004
Confidence (%) 67.7± 17.4 65.9± 21.0 69.2± 13.7 0.473
Calibration (–1 a+ 1) –0.01± 0.21 0.06± 0.22 –0.08± 0.19 0.016
More difficult cases
Accuracy (%) 19.9± 13.5 16.7± 12.8 22.7± 13.7 0.080
Confidence (%) 55.9± 18.6 51.8± 22.1 59.3± 14.5 0.131
Calibration (–1 a+ 1) 0.36± 0.20 0.35± 0.20 0.37± 0.20 0.783
agnostic accuracy scores) were classified as ‘easy’ and
the remaining lesions as ‘difficult’.
Results
Sixty-one of 90 invited students agreed to participate
in the study and were allocated to the RG (n=33) or
the CG (n=28). The proportion of women among the
participating students was larger in the RG than in the
CG (72.7% vs 42.9%; χ2(1)= 5.59, p= 0.035). No differ-
ence in age was observed when the RG and CG were
compared (27.1± 4.3 vs 27.7± 5.9 years, respectively;
p> 0.619). No samples were lost, and no students were
excluded. The students from the two groups showed
no statistically significant difference regarding the de-
grees of self-perception of prior knowledge (3.5± 0.8
vs 3.4± 0.6; p= 0.449) and clinical experience related
to the dermatological diseases (2.9± 0.8 vs 2.7± 0.7;
p= 0.277).
Table 1 presents the results for diagnostic accuracy,
confidence and calibration for the two experimental
conditions. Whereas diagnostic accuracy did not sig-
nificantly differ between the two conditions in their
initial diagnosis of the dermatological lesions, a signif-
icantly higher final diagnostic accuracy was observed
in the RG relative to the CG. Indeed, the analysis of the
difference between initial and final diagnostic accu-
racy scores (i.e. before and after the given task) shows
that the two conditions significantly differ in the gain
across the two diagnoses [RG and CG, mean differ-
ence (standard deviation), respectively: 3.79(7.54) vs
–2.08(10.79); t(59)= 2.49; p= 0.02]. No statistically sig-
nificant difference was observed between the groups
Effect of reflection on accuracy, confidence and calibration
Original Article
regarding the confidence in the accuracy of the final
diagnosis of the cases or in diagnostic calibration.
No statistically significant correlation was observed
between the percentage of estimated number of right
answers provided by the students at the end of the
resolution of all of the cases and the students’ actual
performance in both the RG (r= –0.05; p= 0.775) and
the CG (r= 0.285; p=0.142), suggesting that the stu-
dents were unable to predict their own performance
when diagnosing the studied cases.
Table 2 presents the results of the post hoc anal-
ysis with the split of the cases according to level
of complexity. There was a significant main effect
of case difficulty, F(1, 59) = 192.15, p< 0.001, η2= 0.75,
with calibration showing to be worse on more diffi-
cult than on easier cases. The interaction was also
significant, F(1, 59) = 7.72, p= 0.007, η2= 0.12, because
while the two conditions performed similarly on dif-
ficult cases, the pattern observed on the easy cases
differed. Whereas the CG tended towards overcon-
fidence, the RG showed a slight tendency towards
underconfidence.
Discussion
The present study aimed at investigating the effects
of deliberate reflection on the accuracy of diagnosis
in dermatology cases and on diagnostic calibration.
The findings were only partially in line with our ini-
tial hypotheses. Students who engaged in deliberate
reflection on the dermatological cases showed higher
diagnostic accuracy than those who did not. The ef-
fect was substantial. Deliberate reflection, however,
failed to induce significant differences in students’
confidence and diagnostic calibration.
The positive effect of deliberate reflection on diag-
nostic accuracy, especially when cases are complex,
has been demonstrated in several previous experi-
mental studies [20, 24]. However, this research has
always been conducted in medical specialties such as
internal medicine or emergency medicine, which in-
volve recognition and integration of relevant pieces
of evidence from a case, usually requiring sequential
reasoning. Whether deliberate reflection would also
improve diagnoses of dermatological lesions has not
yet been investigated. Diagnosis in dermatology relies
mostly on visual perception, depending on the clin-
ician’s ability to recognize and classify lesions based
essentially on their visual appearance, with pattern
recognition playing a key role [25]. Nevertheless, our
findings suggest that reflection on these visual aspects
results in a better diagnostic performance. Reflect-
ing to search for contradictory evidence apparently
may help repair a wrong initial diagnosis even when
recognition of relevant features has an essentially vi-
sual nature. Notice that the level of complexity of
the cases, which the final diagnostic accuracy scores
suggest were not straightforward for the study partic-
ipants, may have left room for reflection to help. The
positive effect of reflection on diagnostic accuracy is
relevant for clinical practice, particularly considering
the high prevalence of skin lesions, which have to be
initially assessed by non-specialists such as general
practitioners, with potentially serious consequences
of missed diagnoses for patients [26].
Contrary to our expectation, reflecting upon the
cases did not help align student confidence in the
accuracy of their diagnoses and their actual accuracy.
Students showed similar overconfidence when they
engaged in reflection and when they did not. Studies
in psychological research showed overconfidence to
decrease when participants were requested to present
reasons contradicting their answers, because such
a request was suggested to counteract our tendency
to neglect evidence that goes against our first impres-
sions [14]. By drawing attention to findings in the
case that go against one’s initial diagnosis, deliberate
reflection might act in a similar way. What could then
explain that it failed to improve calibration? One may
argue that because diagnosing dermatology lesions
relies heavily on pattern recognition, deliberate reflec-
tion could make students feel more confident as they
were able to compare patterns thereby potentially
increasing rather than decreasing overconfidence.
The lack of difference in confidence between the
two groups, however, does not seem to support this
conjecture. The potential influence of deliberate re-
flection on judgments of confidence would decrease
if people in fact do not estimate their performance
solely based on their experience with the problem at
hand. One might think that students judge how well
they are solving a clinical case by monitoring their
actual experience throughout the diagnostic process
(for instance: Is it taking too long? Are they struggling
to make sense of the findings?). Research has shown,
however, that rather than from such ‘bottom-up’ ap-
proach, people’s estimates of their performance arise
largely from a ‘top-down’ approach [27]. People start
with their prior beliefs about their ability to perform
a type of task and use these beliefs to judge how well
they are performing in the specific task. Such a top-
down approach based on preconceived judgments
of competence might make it more difficult to gain
from deliberate reflection. This would be particularly
true for less knowledgeable participants due to the
Dunning-Kruger effect [28], the well-established phe-
nomenon showing that poor performers are ‘doubly
cursed’: the lack of expertise that makes them un-
able to give right responses also deprives of from the
ability to know when their answers are right or wrong.
The post hoc analysis distinguishing between easy
and difficult cases seems in line with what would be
expected from the Dunning-Kruger effect. Diagnostic
calibration proved to be worse in more difficult cases,
because students maintained a confidence level simi-
lar to that observed for easy cases despite the accentu-
ated reduction in accuracy. That means, when partic-
ipants were more knowledgeable on the to-be-solved
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problems (easy cases) calibration was much better
than when they lacked enough knowledge (difficult
cases). Moreover, when knowledge was available, on
the easy cases reflection changed the direction of the
miscalibration, eliminating the (already small) over-
confidence. Reflection did not induce any significant
difference in diagnostic calibration, however, on the
difficult cases when participants apparently did not
have enough knowledge to benefit from further study-
ing the case to recognize evidence pointing to the cor-
rect diagnosis and realize that their initial diagnosis
was wrong. This different pattern observed between
easy and difficult cases in our study is also in line with
the hard-easy effect, first described by Lichtenstein
and Fischhoff [29], showing that the excess in partici-
pants’ confidence when answering general knowledge
questions increased in direct proportion to the diffi-
culty of the questions.
In the realm of clinical decision-making, Meyer
et al. [23] also observed that both the accuracy and
the confidence were less aligned when doctors had
to deal with more difficult cases. The excess of con-
fidence regarding accuracy also increased when the
cases became more difficult, contrary to the initial
hypothesis of these authors that both accuracy and
confidence would diminish as the doctors were faced
with more complicated cases. Our study adds to this
previous research to reinforce the idea that diagnos-
tic calibration seems to be a knowledge-dependent
phenomenon. The same knowledge that is required
to accurately diagnose a problem is also necessary
to make accurate confidence judgments and even,
it seems, to benefit from an aid such as deliberate
reflection as a tool to improve calibration.
If this proves true, devising approaches to im-
proving diagnostic calibration is indeed a complex,
challenging endeavour. The difficulty to improve the
excess of confidence is an old concern. Fischhoff
[30], upon reviewing different models and attempts to
eliminate this bias, revealed the lack of the effective-
ness of certain strategies, such as the introduction of
warnings, rewards, or the providing of clear instruc-
tions, and concluded that the excess of confidence is
moderately robust to change.
The present study has some limitations. The small
sample size was sufficient to demonstrate a positive
effect of reflection on diagnostic accuracy, but it may
not have had enough power to show an effect on di-
agnostic calibration, if a small one did in fact exist.
The subanalyses according to the difficulty of the case
must also be evaluated cautiously, given that the dif-
ficulty was not defined a priori, but rather through
the students’ own performance in this study. To avoid
the risk of contamination, we opted to allocate all stu-
dents who were together at the time of the study in
a particular rotation to the same experimental condi-
tion. We systematically alternated the allocation of ro-
tation groups to the conditions, but there was an un-
expected gender imbalance between clinical rotations
resulting in a predominance of women in the reflec-
tion group. Few studies have analyzed the question of
gender in relation to confidence among medical stu-
dents. Blanch et al. [31] showed that, during an objec-
tive structured clinical examination, female medical
students were generally less self-confident than their
male counterparts. As our study showed an excess of
confidence in relation to accuracy, a lower confidence
among women would favour the reflection group con-
cerning calibration, but this was not observed. Hence,
we consider that the different distribution of genders
among the groups did not interfere with our main re-
sults. Finally, the study was performed with final-year
medical students only, and it is not known whether
the findings apply to experienced clinicians.
The present study has important implications for
medical education. This was the first study to demon-
strate that deliberate reflection improves the diagnos-
tic accuracy in dermatological lesions. Regarding the
diagnostic calibration, our findings reinforce prior
studies that show a low correlation between confi-
dence and accuracy, which is even worse for difficult
cases. They suggest that lack of knowledge affects
ability to make not only accurate diagnoses but also
accurate judgments of confidence and point to the
complexity involved in tackling the problem of diag-
nostic calibration. Further research should investigate
whether our findings apply to more experienced clin-
icians and study other interventions that may help
improve calibration.
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